DRAFT: Open letter to NASA | Response to final PEIS | Planetary protection issues abstract | main points in open letter in more depth | Finding an inspiring future | executive summary of preprint | Low risk like house fires and smoke detectors | About me | DRAFT: Endorsements by experts | Why this needs an open letter with endorsements | Call to NASA to defer or withdraw EIS | Letters | BOOK: Preprint to submit to academic publishers

Author: Robert Walker, contact email robert@robertinventor.com

Abstract of NEPA issues for open letter to NASA – Summary of the main planetary protection issues with your Environmental Impact Statement for the samples you plan to return from Mars in 2033 - MID EDIT

This is a short summary of the major planetary protection issues in NASA's draft EIS to accompany the open letter. See also NASA's legal requirements under NEPA.

I’m Robert Walker I was author of one of the last two public comments on your Environmental impact statement for samples returned from Mars. I found many mistakes in it. As I explain in the Open Letter my aim here is not to stop the mission. I have strong interest in the astrobiology of Mars and I want this to succeed and be the best mission it can be. My aim is to help you find a way to do this which is safe for Earth and also best for science too.

In this page I will focus on the NEPA requirements which gives a useful framework to discuss the many issues I found in the EIS. Also. since I commented in a timely fashion during the public comments period, I have legal standing under NEPA and you actually have legal requirements to respond to the issues I raised under NEPA. As we'll see, so far you haven't fulfilled this requirement.

For a short summary of the legal requirements I refer to here, see my summary of the relevant parts of the NEPA code: NASA's legal requirements under NEPA. You'd need to ask a NEPA lawyer for your legal requirements. I am not a lawyer but the text seems clear and I also refer to some legal cases that clarify part of it.

You have a legal requirement under NEPA to consider reasonable alternatives such as the one I submitted of a miniature telerobotic facility above GEO similar to the Europa Lander proposal you looked at in 2016

I submitted a reasonable alternative of a miniature telerobotic facility above GEO for astrobiological studies similar to the miniature lab you wish to send to Europa and Mars in the future - which would achieve all your science goals, would enhance the mission with more science return and would keep Earth 100% safe. I submitted this alternative during both rounds of public comments period in May (Comment by Robert Walker posted on May 16th) repeated in December.(Comment by Robert Walker posted December 20th). You have a legal requirement to identify this alternative in the draft EIS § 1502.17 and to provide a rigorous analysis of it § 1502.14. This wasn't done. I will talk about this later in this abstract.

First I will look at the issues with your own proposal.

We need broad acceptance at both lay public and scientific levels for this mission to succeed - this is not the Apollo era, times are different now

I will focus on the major planetary protection mistakes in the EIS. This is why your mission is never going to succeed in its current form. We are in different times from the Apollo era. As your first planetary protection officer John Rummel put it in 2002:

“Broad acceptance at both lay public and scientific levels is essential to the overall success of this research effort.”

(A draft test protocol for detecting possible biohazards in Martian samples returned to Earth: 99)

[TO ADD - HEADERS]

Your employee Chester Everline says that the EIS didn't state a level of risk that you are prepared to take for large-scale harm to Earth's biosphere - without that you can't do risk assurance - and said if the meteorite argument can't be convincingly demonstrated NASA should consider not returning samples as described in the EIS but defer the return until the risks are better understood

I’ll start with the comment you received from your employee Chester Everline, co-author of your handbook on probabilistic risk assurance (Probabilistic risk assessment procedures guide for NASA managers and practitioners). He found that the EIS didn’t state clearly what level of risk NASA is prepared to take for Earth’s biosphere.

A possible consequence of unsuccessful containment is an ecological catastrophe. Although such an occurrence is unlikely, NASA should at least be clear regarding what level of risk it is willing to assume (for the biosphere of the entire planet)

…

If the MSR Campaign can convincingly demonstrate that material returned to Earth by MSR will be subjected to more severe conditions than those transported by natural processes, then MSR poses no greater risk to Earth than we would expect from the next Mars meteorite.

 

However, if this cannot be convincingly demonstrated [IT CAN’T AS WE WILL SEE] the MSR Campaign should seriously consider not returning samples using the technology described in the PEIS (i.e., transition to a deferred return campaign option).

A better statement of options should include the possibility of delaying the return of Mars samples until the risks associated with their return are better understood

(Comment posted December 20th)

I checked the report. NASA were not prepared to give an answer to the question from the comments received from the general public:

Just how low is “low likelihood”? Is NASA’s goal specification to prevent accidental release of the Mars samples 1 in a thousand? 1 in a million? 1 in a billion?

(MSR FINAL EIS 3–3),

NASA just said

No outcome in science and engineering processes can be predicted with 100% certainty.

[then deflect away from the question] The safety case for MSR safety is based on ..

(MSR FINAL EIS 3–3),

So it’s as Chester Everline said. You can’t do probabilistic risk assurance without a target probability – so this EIS isn’t doing probabilistic risk assurance.

I contacted Chester Everline via email – to ask if we could liaise. He doesn’t have expertise in planetary protection. When he did that comment he didn’t know the asteroid argument was disproved long ago. After all why would he expect NASA to mis-summarize the literature in an Environmental Impact Statement? He’d naturally assume a basic scientific integrity – but that is not what we find in this EIS.

The asteroid argument Chester Everline mentions was refuted by the Mars sample return study in 2009 - also the very cite you use for the sentence refutes it

The Mars asteroid argument was refuted in the 2009 Mars sample return study from the Space Studies Board:

Thus, the potential hazards posed for Earth by viable organisms surviving in samples is [are] significantly greater with a Mars sample return than if the same organisms were brought to Earth via impact-mediated ejection from Mars

(Assessment of planetary protection requirements for Mars sample return missions : 47).  

The Space Studies Board panel goes on to say (SSB, 2009: 48):  

… Thus it is not appropriate to argue that the existence of martian meteorites on Earth negate the need to treat as potentially hazardous any samples returned from Mars by robotic spacecraft.

(Assessment of planetary protection requirements for Mars sample return missions : 48).

The meteorite argument is also refuted in the very cite you use from 2019. Your EIS says:

“The natural delivery of Mars materials can provide better protection and faster transit than the current MSR mission concept … First, potential Mars microbes would be expected to survive ejection forces and pressure (National Academies of Sciences, …, 2019), …” (MSR FINAL EIS 3–3),

It was a remarkable discovery around the turn of the century that some exceptionally hardy terrestrial microbes can withstand the ejection forces and pressure.

Whereas this harsh environment sets a definite barrier for most microorganisms known,

…These characteristics make spores and anhydrobiotic bacteria especially prepared for coping with the extreme conditions of space

(Natural transfer of viable microbes in space: 1. From Mars to Earth and Earth to Mars : 392).

Your 2019 cite for “potential Mars microbes would be expected to survive ejection forces and pressure “ says:

“The sample may well come from an environment that mechanically cannot become a Mars meteorite. The microbes may not be able to survive impact ejection and transport through space.”

(Planetary protection classification of sample return missions from the Martian moons : 45)

So your cite refutes the statement you attached it to.

To use a cite that refutes the sentence it is attached to also goes against the most basic requirement of an EIS under NEPA to maintain scientific integrity - and this is for one of the most important arguments in the EIS

This goes against the most basic requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement.

This is the first of numerous mistakes in the EIS - which lead you to conclude that the environmental effects would not be significant

After many plausible seeming but invalid arguments, your EIS says:

The relatively low probability of an inadvertent reentry combined with the assessment that samples are unlikely to pose a risk of significant ecological impact or other significant harmful effects support the judgement that the potential environmental impacts would not be significant.

The EIS doesn't mention the conclusion of ALL the major studies to date - experts are of the view that any risk from life returned from Mars is low - but it is not provably zero - a low risk of large scale harm to human health and the environment - highly significant - Margaret Race's analogy of a house fire and a smoke detector captures the essence of their conclusions aptly

On the probability of harm resulting from life returned from Mars, Margaret Race, a biologist working on planetary protection and Mars sample return for the SETI Institute and specialist in environmental impact analysis used the analogy of a smoke detector. She wrote this in response to non-peer-reviewed suggestions by the space colonization enthusiast and leader of the Mars Society Robert Zubrin to drop all planetary protection for samples returned from Mars:

If he were an architect, would he suggest designing buildings without smoke detectors or fire extinguishers?

Hazardous Until Proven Otherwise, in (Opinion: No Threat? No Way : 5)

Hand installing smoke detector labelled “NASA” and wooden ceiling of a house labelled “Earth”

(Smoke detector graphic from The EnergySmart Academy)

Carl Sagan is one of my heroes and I have the same focus as him in this respect. Enthusiastic about space science. Keen on space exploration, including both robotic and human exploration. Watched the Apollo landings in amazement in the 1960s. Marvelled at the Voyager “grand tour” of the solar system. But I also greatly value Earth’s biosphere and its inhabitants.

For me, the value of Earth and its inhabitants is essentially infinite.

Carl Sagan was a pioneer in planetary protection - first paper in 1960 (Biological contamination of the Moon). He put it like this:

“I, myself, would love to be involved in the first manned expedition to Mars. But an exhaustive program of unmanned biological exploration of Mars is necessary first.

“The likelihood that such pathogens exist is probably small, but we cannot take even a small risk with a billion lives.”

quote from: (The Cosmic Connection – an Extraterrestrial Perspective)

ALL the major studies for a Mars sample return are in agreement, there is a risk of large-scale effects though it is believed by experts to be low . This runs through the planetary protection literature from the beginnings of the discipline, in the late 1950s to 60s, with Joshua Lederberg, Carl Sagan and others, onwards (When Biospheres Collide : 35, 420)

The most recent European Space Foundation (ESF) Mars sample return study in 2012 concurs with the 2009 Mars sample review and indeed all the major sample return studies to date:

The Study Group also concurs with another conclusion from the NRC reports (1997, 2009) that the potential for large-scale effects on the Earth’s biosphere by a returned Mars life form appears to be low, but is not demonstrably zero.

(Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 20)

In more detail they say:

… it is not possible to estimate a probability that the sample could be harmful or harmless in the classical frequency definition of probability.

However it is possible to establish the risk as low, as a consensus of the beliefs of the experts in the field as represented by their experience.

(Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 24)

The 2012 ESF study says Mars samples should be treated like the highest risk organisms we know - risk group 4 and your second planetary protection officer Cassie Conley makes the same point in an official NASA video - this is the mainstream consensus

The 2012 ESF study goes on to say Mars samples should be treated like risk group 4 organisms (high individual and community risk, highly infectious, no treatment available) until we know more. I.e. we should treat them as significant.(Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 24)

Cassie Conley, former NASA planetary protection officer from 2006 - 2018 summarized it like this:

“that means we are going to contain the samples as if they were the most hazardous Earth organisms that we know about, Ebola virus.”

at 1:02 into this official NASA video

The EIS doesn't mention this view which is not only the majority view it is the CONSENSUS of all major Mars sample return studies to date - this fails the NEPA requirement to consider all major points of view on the environmental impacts

The EIS doesn’t mention this which is not even a majority view, it’s a consensus of ALL Mars sample return studies to date. This fails another requirement of an Environmental Impact Statement

I am not able to liaise with employees of NASA who find issues with your EIS - and it seems unlikely I can get help from former planetary protection officers of ESA or NASA

I sent an email to Chester Everline to ask if we could liaise– combining his expertise in probabilistic risk assurance and my familiarity with the planetary protection literature – but I was not surprised when he responded saying as a NASA employee he couldn’t engage.

It was a similar situation when I contacted your first planetary protection officer John Rummel. He was the obvious academic to contact as principle author, co-author, or contributor to nearly all the major studies on a Mars sample return, including the 2009 Mars sample return study I just mentioned which refuted the meteorite argument - and indeed much of the literature on the topic for the last several decades. But I don't think I can liaise with him either.

He just said he has retired and said I should contact the planetary protection office (which has not replied). He also reassured me that someone would listen to my concerns.

This was puzzling at the time but I now understand why it happened from a very helpful history in the most recent Space Studies Board report from 2018 and an article from 2017.

I found out you closed down your planetary protection office, which operated from 1997 to 2017 (With planetary protection office up for grabs, …), after first closing down the interagency panel in 2006 (Review and Assessment of Planetary Protection … : 26) which could have advised you, for instance on public health, and the planetary protection subcommittee in 2016.

Your current planetary protection engineer says your priority for planetary protection now is to prepare the way for humans to go to Mars as fast as possible, and you want other agencies to help support this goal (SMA Leadership Profile: Nick Benardini). He is now an employee in your Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, with no independence from NASA.

Also – this is too recent to be mentioned in the 2018 Space Studies Board report, but it seems that ESA is following NASA’s lead. That would make sense, even though not involved in writing the EIS they would have had to sign off on it at a high level – because ESA would have to go through planetary protection assessments too, following EU law if they though the environmental impacts could be significant from samples they are returning, even though the plan is to return them to the USA.

I tried to contact ESA’s planetary protection officer Gerhard Kminek. He is still listed as ESA’s Planetary Protection Officer on their website (Planetary protection). I alerted him to the issue of your high level of forwards contamination of the samples which would make safety testing impossible since he is a co-author of the COSPAR study cited in the EIS (COSPAR Sample Safety Assessment Framework (SSAF)). I asked him if my reasoning is correct that the level of terrestrial contamination makes the safety testing pointless.

His response was similar to John Rummel’s:

I am no longer the PPO for ESA. I have forwarded your message to our current PPO and the chair of the COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection.

He didn’t say why he no longer has the job. But the new post is called " Planetary Protection and Space Debris Mitigation Officer " .

The job was advertised (ESA: Planetary Protection and Space Debris Mitigation Officer) but I haven’t yet found out who got it.

The new officer has many responsibilities now:

(Planetary Protection and Space Debris Mitigation Officer)

That is way too much for one person unless they give only a small amount of attention to each job. So it rather looks as though ESA has followed the lead of NASA and has de-emphasized planetary protection At any rate I got no reply to the email ESA's former planetary protection officer forwarded to them.

So the end result of all this is that it seems that

Space Studies Board made a very clear recommendation to re-establish an appropriate advisory body - amongst other things for peer review to catch these mistakes - this was not done

The Space Studies Board’s recommendation is very clear. In 2018 they said you need to re-establish an appropriate advisory body and process – amongst other things – for critical peer review.

Finding: The development and implementation of planetary protection policy at NASA has benefited in the past from a formally constituted independent advisory process and body. As this report is written, both the advisory body and process are in a state of suspension.

Recommendation 3.6: NASA should reestablish an independent and appropriate advisory body and process to help guide formulation and implementation of planetary protection adequate to serve the best interests of the public, the NASA program, and the variety of new entrants that may become active

The roles of the advisory body include the following:

[other roles] …

Act as a peer review forum to facilitate the effectiveness of NASA’s planetary protection activities.

(Review and Assessment of Planetary Protection … : 61 - 62)

NEPA requires agencies to use an interdisciplinary approach in the social sciences - previous studies have emphasized the need to set up fora dedicated to ethical and social considerations and transparent communication with the public and this hasn't been done

Agencies shall prepare environmental impact statements using an interdisciplinary approach that will ensure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts … The disciplines of the preparers shall be appropriate to the scope and issues identified in the scoping process
§ 1507.2 [links directly to legal text]

previous studies such as the ESF study emphasize the need to set up fora dedicated to ethical and social considerations of the risk at an international level open to representatives of all countries and to have transparent methods to communicate accountability, benefits, risks and uncertainties

RECOMMENDATION 3

Potential risks from an MSR are characterised by their complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity, as defined by the International Risk Governance Committee’s risk governance framework. As a consequence, civil society, the key stakeholders, the scientific community and relevant agencies’ staff should be involved in the process of risk governance as soon as possible.

In this context, transparent communication covering the accountability, the benefits, the risks and the uncertainties related to an MSR is crucial throughout the whole process. Tools to effectively interact with individual groups should be developed (e.g. a risk map).

RECOMMENDATION 4

Potential negative consequences resulting from an unintended release could be borne by a larger set of countries than those involved in the programme. It is recommended that mechanisms and fora dedicated to ethical and social issues of the risks and benefits raised by an MSR are set up at the international level and are open to representatives of all countries

(Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 59).

This was not done.

NEPA requires agencies to use an interdisciplinary approach in the natural sciences - the mistakes I found seem to be due to a lack of an interdisciplinary approach

It’s important to recognize these mistakes are not the fault of any authors of the EIS. The Space Studies Board say they need to educate committee members unfamiliar with basic planetary protection concepts.

“ … with additional time being required to educate those committee members unfamiliar with basic planetary protection concepts.”

(Review and Assessment of Planetary Protection Policy Development Processes : 77)

They are clear and major mistakes.

One basic mistake pervades the report - the EIS looks at best case scenarios for planetary protection throughout. But we need to look for worst case scenarios, as with the analogy of a smoke detector.

I saw no awareness even of worst case scenarios previously discussed in the planetary protection literature – such as for example Tetanus – this is not adapted to an infectious lifestyle in any organism but kills thousands of unvaccinated newborns ever year (Tetanus). This example is not mentioned anywhere, or any examples of terrestrial analogues that illustrate how microbes from Mars could harm humans or our environment. This is one of numerous examples mentioned by Warmflash et al. (Assessing the Biohazard Potential of Putative Martian Organisms for Exploration Class Human Space Missions, 14–15)

Warmflash et al. are discussing what we should do if we find opportunistic diseases of humans when we explore Mars. They suggest we contain them as far as possible, through biological .containment on Mars and quarantine on return to Earth., writing:

Since the discovery and study of Martian life can have long-term benefits for humanity, the risk that Martian life might include pathogens should not be an obstacle to human exploration.

. (Assessing the Biohazard Potential of Putative Martian Organisms for Exploration Class Human Space Missions, 2)

But your EIS doesn’t make this argument. It didn’t find ANY worst case scenarios.

These arguments reinforce false beliefs in the space community. They are already used, in good faith but incorrectly, to recommend dropping all planetary protection for samples from Mars, for instance by Robert Zubrin, president of the Mars society (Contamination From Mars: No Threat) with the response from planetary protection experts (Opinion: No Threat? No Way : 4 - 7)

These are Zubrin's four plausible but invalid reasons for dropping all planetary protection. They are affirmed and not countered in this EIS: I summarize briefly why they are in valid in square brackets, briefly summarized the detailed explanations presented in the open letter.

For details see this section and following in the Open letter:

NEPA requires agencies to describe any reasonable alternatives and provide a rigorous analysis - so far my reasonable alternative of a telerobotic facility above GEO similar to the Europa lander hasn't been described or analysed in the draft EIS

Then, I suggested a reasonable alternative during the public comments period in May (Comment by Robert Walker posted on May 16th) repeated in December.(Comment by Robert Walker posted December 20th)

This would

So - that's the suggestion. I outline it in detail in the open letter. I'd like to remind you that under NEPA you are legally required to

This is what the NEPA text says:

(a) Evaluate reasonable alternatives to the proposed action, and, for alternatives that the agency eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their elimination.

(b) Discuss each alternative considered in detail, including the proposed action, so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.
§ 1502.14 [links directly to legal text]

This requirement extends to any reasonable alternatives submitted in a timely fashion during the public comments periods.

The draft environmental impact statement shall include a summary that identifies all alternatives, information, and analyses submitted by State, Tribal, and local governments and other public commenters during the scoping process for consideration by the lead and cooperating agencies in developing the environmental impact statement.

§ 1502.17

My suggestion of a miniature telerobotic facility above GEO is a reasonable alternative. So you had a legal requirement to include a summary of my reasonable alternative in the draft EIS and to do a rigorous analysis of it.

There is NO MENTION of the suggestion to return samples to a telerobotic facility above GEO never mind a rigorous analysis. Nor have you given any reason for not considering this suggestion. This is all you said in the draft EIS, about public comments suggesting you sterilize samples before they are returned to Earth:

Consideration of techniques to assess samples and for sterilization prior to returning to Earth:

., .

Sterilizing the entirety of the material returned from Mars would compromise specific scientific goals, as outlined in the discussion of sterilization-sensitive science by Meyer et al. (2022) in the “Final Report of the Mars Sample Return Science Planning Group 2 (MSPG2)”

(MSR FINAL EIS : 4–2)

This doesn't mention the reasonable alternative of studying samples above orbit using telerobotics. As described my suggestion would not compromise any scientific goals.

Any rigorous analysis would also have to outline which goals you think it compromises and then weigh that against the extra protection to Earth of keeping it 100% safe.

The Council on Environmental Quality clarified that the requirement to consider reasonable alternatives persists even after its narrowing of scope in its 2021 revision of NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions – Supplementary information).

The revision clarifies that agencies have discretion to consider a variety of factors when assessing an application for an authorization, removing the requirement that an agency base the purpose and need on the goals of an applicant and the agency's statutory authority

See also, e.g., Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Agencies enjoy `considerable discretion' to define the purpose and need of a project.

However, `an agency cannot define its objectives in unreasonably narrow terms.'

In that passage, the CEQ reasserts that it is not enough to mention reasonable alternatives, they also need adequate consideration. The CEQ also mention National Parks v. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 606 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009).

Looking at the details of National Parks v. Bureau of Land Mgmt,, the relevant EIS did mention many reasonable alternatives but dismissed them because of narrowly drawn up project objectives. The justices ruled:

Agencies enjoy "considerable discretion" to define the purpose and need of a project. Friends of Southeast's Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998).

However, "an agency cannot define its objectives in unreasonably narrow terms." City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. United States Dep't. of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997).

You use a similar approach of a narrowly drawn up needs section. Your “Need for the proposed action” has a requirement to return unsterilized samples to Earth for “safety testing”

These same principles regarding the importance of using terrestrial laboratories to enable the best scientific return also apply to the care and attention to detail that would be required to conduct a proper and comprehensive sample safety assessment in the proposed SRF [Sample Receiving Facility].

(MSR FINAL EIS : S-2)

This need for safety testing is used explicitly to rule out the reasonable alternative of sterilizing the samples before they reach Earth in your section on response to public comments:

Consideration of techniques to assess samples and for sterilization prior to returning to Earth

…

The MSPG2 report notes that the process of successfully completing the MSR Sample Safety Assessment Protocol involves a variety of complex operations that would not be feasible on Mars

(MSR FINAL EIS : 4–2)

There is no need to do the MSR Sample Safety Assessment Protocol if all samples are examined unsterilized in orbit and are sterilized before they reach Earth. That’s because there wouldn’t be any need for a Sample Receiving Facility, except as a place to store sterilized samples.

More issues with scientific integrity - currency and accuracy

This is the NEPA requirement:

Agencies shall ensure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses in environmental impact statements
§ 1502.23 [Links directly to the legal text]

The EIS has major issues, mainly

A credible scientific report needs to be reviewed carefully to eliminate or minimize such errors ( . The CRAAP test. ) ( .,CRAA(M)P Test , ) ( ., Source Evaluation, a quick guide to CRAAP .).

Many issues with currency - much of the research that the EIS relies on has been superceded and they don't cite the most recent research

We haven't had a comprehensive Mars sample return review since 2009, published just weeks before the report that the Phoenix lander team had spotted droplets of what appeared to be salty water droplets on the lander legs. This was the first of numerous discoveries that have not been looked at in any Mars sample return study.

Then the ESF did a size limit study in 2012 which updated the size of particle to contain with a requirement to contain ultramicrobacteria and gene transfer agents which the EIS doesn't consider.

The EIS cites the SR-SAG2 study from 2014 without explaining to the reader (and possibly the authors didn't know themselves) that NASA and ESA immediately commissioned a review of it by the Space Studies Board that found many knowledge gaps in it.

We definitely need a new review of the size limit and level of assurance over a decades after the 2012 ESF study by their recommendations. And there have been so many advances in our understanding of Mars in the last 14 years, and of terrestrial extremophiles and pathogens, we surely need a new Mars sample return study. We can expect many more changes between 2009 and today than there were between the 2009 report and the previous report in 1997. This also has not been done.

That is the main thing I've worked on for 5 months, half time, a preliminary literature survey of material relevant to a Mars sample return, and I feel I am just scratching the surface.

Then we also need other disciplines to look at any plans, especially the CDC, human health, epidemiologists etc. I'm sure they would confirm that quarantine couldn't keep out a fungal disease from Mars or mirror life.

Space Studies Board review found many ways Jezero Crater could be more habitable than suggested in the review SR-SAG2 used in the EIS - this is a serious omission since NASA and ESA commissioned the Space Studies board review out of concerns that the authors of SR-SAG2 were too closely aligned with the Mars Program Office

The draft EIS singles out Jezero crater as a place on the Martian surface which they say is especially inhospitable for life to survive  NASA, 2022 : 1-6):

Consensus opinion within the astrobiology scientific community supports a conclusion that the Martian surface is too inhospitable for life to survive there today, particularly at the location and shallow depth (6.4 centimeters [2.5 inches]) being sampled by the Perseverance rover in Jezero Crater, which was chosen as the sampling area because it could have had the right conditions to support life in the ancient past, billions of years ago (Rummel et al. 2014, Grant et al. 2018).

[Rummel et al., 2014 is often referred to as SR-SAG2]

Their cite Grant et al seems to be a mistake. It’s about the geographic features of the landing site. It briefly mentions in one sentence that Vastitas Borealis was rejected partly for planetary protection reasons because of subsurface ice. That's it. But the other cite Rummel et al is SR-SAG2.

NASA and ESA took the unusual step of commissioning a review of this study partly in response to concerns its authors were too closely aligned with the Mars Program office

NASA and ESA commissioned this review of SR-SAG2 partly out of concerns that MEPAG is not independent from NASA. When they found out that they had similar concerns they commissioned a combined review.

There were two reasons why both agencies took the seemingly unusual step of independently commissioning reviews of a review paper that was to be published in a peer-reviewed journal.

First, there is the perception in some circles that MEPAG is not independent and that its views are too closely aligned with NASA’s Mars Program Office.

( Review of the MEPAG report on Mars special regions. : xi – xii).

Many of the knowledge gaps identified in the Space Studies Board review of SR-SAG2 are highly significant for Jezero crater

I will go into this in some depth because the SR-SAG2 picture is so widely cited and the Space Studies Board review isn't so well known. It paints a picture of a potentially far more habitable Mars especially when combined with new discoveries since 2015 about potential new microhabitats, biofilms and transport through the atmosphere amongst others.

Indeed,the (Review of the MEPAG report on Mars special regions) modified all the main conclusions from SR-SAG2 relevant to NASA's statement about Jezero crater in the EIS. This is why it was such a serious - though understandable neophyte error to refer to SR-SAG2 without mentioning the Space Studies Board review of it.

This emphasis on SR-SAG2 in the literature may have contributed to a common belief that Mars is highly likely to be uninhabitable amongst many space enthusiasts. You get a very different picture when you read the report of the ( Mars Extant Life: What's Next? Conference Report) ( html), a three day conference held in 2019 to discuss potential for present day life on Mars.

A significant subset of conference attendees concluded that there is a realistic possibility that Mars hosts indigenous microbial life. A powerful theme that permeated the conference is that the key to the search for martian extant life lies in identifying and exploring refugia (“oases”), where conditions are either permanently or episodically significantly more hospitable than average. Based on our existing knowledge of Mars, conference participants highlighted four potential martian refugium (not listed in priority order): Caves, Deep Subsurface, Ices, and Salts.”

I cover this in the open letter under: ..

The European space foundation said we have to contain ultramicrobacteria and gene transfer agents - well beyond the capabilities of a BSL-4 - based on the science of 2012

The ESF in 2012 updated this 1999 requirement to 1 in a million containment for a single particle of 0.01 microns or larger, and 100% containment for 0.05 microns or larger (Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 48).

Screenshots from (Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 21). and (Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 48).

Their recommendation of 100% containment at 0.05 microns was the result of reviewing reports that ultramicrobacteria are still viable after passing through a 0.1 micron nanopore (Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 15). They cited two studies, in freshwater from Greenland (Detection and isolation of ultrasmall microorganisms from a 120,000-year-old Greenland glacier ice core) and 20 different sites in Switzerland (Quantification of the filterability of freshwater bacteria through 0.45, 0.22, and 0.1 μm pore size filters and shape-dependent enrichment of filterable bacterial communities).

The ESF says we need to do a new review of the size limit and level of assurance regularly - definitely needed a decade later - so even their limit is now out of date

Also before developing any such technology we need a review of the size limits and level of assurance - the ESF in 2012 said we need to do this regularly

Based on our current knowledge and techniques (especially genomics), one can assume that if the expected minimum size for viruses, GTAs or free-living microorganisms decreases in the future, and this is indeed possible, it will be at a slower pace than over the past 15 years.

However, no one can disregard the possibility that future discoveries of new agents, entities and mechanisms may shatter our current understanding on minimum size for biological entities. As a consequence, it is recommended that the size requirement as presented above is reviewed and reconsidered on a regular basis

(Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 21)

RECOMMENDATION 8: Considering that (i) scientific knowledge as well as risk perception can evolve at a rapid pace over the time, and (ii) from design to curation, an MSR mission will last more than a decade, the ESF-ESSC Study Group recommends that values on level of assurance and maximum size of released particle are re-evaluated on a regular basis

(Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 48)

A decade later this review is needed first before we can design any air incinerators or filters to the new standard.

Science has moved on hugely in the last 14 years since 2009 - many new discoveries e.g. very recent discovery through gene sequencing of "dark matter fungi" - fungi that infect microbes including fresh water algae - and marine algae - a "mystery yet to unravel"

Science has moved on so much in the last 14 years NASA surely needs a new Mars sample return review in 2023 similar to the ones from 2009 (Assessment of planetary protection requirements for Mars sample return missions) and 1997 (Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations) 12 years before the 2009 study.

In my literature survey, I found there have been many advances in science relevant to a Mars sample return since 2009. That includes new discoveries of extremophiles including ones that also do well in normal conditions, capabilities of terrestrial organisms in Mars simulation chambers, new discoveries about terrestrial pathogens such as the very recent discovery of fungal parasites of blue-green algae (Discovery of dark matter fungi) (Basal parasitic fungi in marine food webs—a mystery yet to unravel), new potential habitats on Mars, new discoveries about the potential for life to be transferred in the Martian dust storms, advances in synthetic biology, new ideas about the potential for independently evolved life, and many other topics.

We surely need a new Mars sample return review before we can consider returning unsterilized samples to a receiving lab on Earth - like the study 14 years ago in 2009 and the earlier one 12 years previously in 1997 - each time we find more things that need to be considered

A new review is surely needed before NASA can be ready to do a new EIS, if the mission is going to return unsterilized samples to Earth. The 2012 ESF study focuses mainly on limits of size and filter requirements, and levels of assurance and is itself 10 years out of date now.

The issues raised during the public comments period

I know I only have legal standing under NEPA for issues that I raised in a timely fashion during the public comments period. Almost all of this open letter is based on those comments.

In the first round of public comments I raised a serious issue with use of a Biosafety Level 4 facility (BSL-4), that it doesn't comply with the recommendations of the European Space Foundation (ESF) in 2012, and I proposed a solution that keeps Earth 100% safe. It has an attachment that goes into this issue and other issues in great detail and which also goes into the ESF recommendations and their practical and legal implications in great detail. I'd like to remind you that you have an obligation under NEPA to read these comments and respond to major issues raised:

This has one attachment. At the time I wasn't aware that NEPA had streamlined its process which is the reason for the 2039 date in the title.

Your draft EIS doesn't mention that anyone in the public raised issues with your plans to use a BSL-4 and doesn't mention the recommendations in the ESF Mars sample return study that I alerted you to in the first round of public comments. It also doesn't identify the reasonable alternative that I suggested, never mind provide a rigorous analysis of it. I'd like to remind you that you have an obligation under NEPA to do both these things.

I then commented on the Draft PEIS itself. I found numerous very major mistakes in the EIS. I summarize them briefly in the comment in 14 points .

It has 8 attachments which go into detail and are the legal basis for this open letter under the NEPA process, though it's better to refer to this open letter and the preprint for the latest version. The first graphic in the first attachment illustrates the main issue with the EIS that I identified using Margaret Race's analogy of a smoke detector .

Text on graphic: We need to install “smoke detectors” to protect Earth.

The risk of large scale effects from NASA’s mission is likely very low - indeed unlikely it returns life at all but it’s not demonstrably zero.

The risk of a fire to your house is also low.

We need the smoke detectors just in case. Especially for a “house” for billions of people.

Especially as we likely have many future missions like this from many countries.

Background graphics:

. Smoke detector.JPG - Wikimedia Commons

And this photo of a fire from the Los Angeles fire department, “Smoke alarm saves residents of a Bel Air home”

And fire extinguisher File:Fire-Extinguisher.JPG - Wikimedia Commons

Minor issue - I made the pdf for that first attachment using a method that didn't preserve links by mistake. However it's a pdf for my blog post here - completed on 16th December before the end of the public comments period - has the same links and the function correctly here:

The attachments include a graphical abstract of the reasonable alternative. Here it is with a minor typo fixed:

Text on graphic How to keep Earth 100% safe with minimal impact on science or cost – technology doesn’t exist to contain ultramicrobacteria.

So we can

1. sterilize all samples or

2. check for life first - to do this, return samples to a safe orbit above GEO to study remotely with miniature instruments like those designed by astrobiologists to search for life on Mars.

With 2. we can return sterilized sub-samples from the orbital facility immediately.

In 2, a return to the ISS doesn't break the chain of containment with Mars and COSPAR decided the Moon must be kept free of contamination for future astronauts and tourists. Above GEO solves both these issues.

1. and 2. both have simple legal processes.

Mars may resemble Earth's coldest driest deserts: small niches for life adapted to extreme conditions, perhaps habitable at microbial scales only. Earth is protected from a Mars sample return by numerous laws to protect Earth's biosphere that didn't exist in 1969. Solution 2: study in a safe orbit above Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) first. Humans never go near the satellite. Samples stay above GEO. No risk to Earth's biosphere. Astrobiologists study samples in orbit much as they would do controlling a rover on Mars. Sterilized subsamples can be returned immediately.

However note that I realized since then that safety testing isn't possible even above GEO until we know a lot more. See the graphic at the start of the Open letter to NASA.

This is another important attachment::

Since I submitted that last comment, I’ve been working on a preprint and literature survey to look at this in more depth, based on a paper I was already working on, on planetary protection for your sample return mission before you started on the EIS process. The preprint is here:

The last major Mars sample return review was in 2009, the previous one was 12 years earlier in 1997. Now, 14 years later we need a new sample return review - the 2009 study was published just weeks before the unexpected discovery of droplets of salty water on the legs of the Phoenix lander which were later replicated in Mars simulation chamber experiments, and there have been many other surprises since then.

In the Open letter to NASA. I add [NEW] to section titles here for material that turned up as a result of the literature survey. Everything else is already covered in those 8 attachments and most of them are already covered in the attachment to my response during the first round of public comments in May.

SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS

Let’s look at a summary of the main points. These were posted on the last day of public comments to your draft EIS.

Since then my preprint and literature survey added many more details but hasn't led to any changes in those main points.

I recommend this draft Environmental Impact Statement is stopped, and a new one prepared after doing the necessary size limits review, and fixing whatever led to its many errors.

1. The BSL-4 recommendation in this EIS is out of date, based on science of 1999.
2. This EIS does not mention the most recent Mars Sample Return study from 2012 by the European Space Foundation which reduced the 1999 size limit from 0.2 microns to 0.05 microns to contain ultramicrobacteria and required 100% containment at that size.
3. A BSL-4 is not designed to this standard. In recent reviews of filter technology, I find NO AIR FILTERS with that capability – and no evidence anybody is working on them. Air filters for larger particles remove some of these very small particles kicked out of the airstream by jostling of air molecules by Brownian motion but can't remove all. It is an unusual requirement.
4. NASA haven't responded to my comment in May which alerted them to this omission. They still don't cite the ESF study. Also, the ESF said their limit needs to be updated periodically. An update is certainly due a decade later.
5. The EIS has an overnarrow scope in the Purpose and Need section - it requires samples to be returned unsterilized to terrestrial labs for "safety testing". This won’t work. NASA believe they reduced the most abundant biosignatures to 0.7 nanograms per gram of returned rock sample – this guarantees a positive test. There will be no way to know if tubes contain safe terrestrial life or potentially unsafe martian life.
6. This narrow scope improperly excludes the reasonable alternative of presterilizing samples before they reach Earth's biosphere - which achieves virtually the same science return and keeps Earth 100% safe. By a 1997 case in the 7th circuit this alone probably invalidates the EIS.
7. The high levels of forward contamination make astrobiology almost impossible. I recommend bonus samples of dirt, dust and atmosphere collected in a STERILE container with no terrestrial organics, brought to Mars, especially on the ESA fetch rover.
8. I recommend returning these bonus astrobiology samples to a safe orbit above GEO where they can be tested for life
9. The EIS’s reasoning for no significant environmental effects contradicts the conclusion of the NRC study from 2009 which they do cite, which says the risk of even large-scale impacts on human health or environment is likely low but not demonstrably non zero. It also warns against the meteorite argument that they use. I found multiple errors in my analysis.
10. Returned life COULD be harmful. Example, fungi kill crops, other life and sometimes immunocompromised humans. Botulism, ergot disease, tetanus, all are the results of exotoxins not adapted to the lifeforms they kill, similarly some algal blooms kill dogs and cows that eat them. BMAA misincorporated for L-serine causes protein misfolding and is a neurotoxin implicated in some cases of the disease that affected Steven Hawking - an alternative biochemistry may have many different amino acids similar enough to terrestrial amino acids to be misincorporated. Or perhaps martian life evolved from scratch from mirror chemicals as mirror life - the effect on our biosphere can't be predicted. I give many such examples in my preprint. Or it could be harmless like microbes from a terrestrial desert, or indeed beneficial. But we DON'T KNOW. So we need to find out first.
11. What matters for invasive species are the ones that can’t ‘get here, like starlings that can't cross the Atlantic rather than barn swallows. The freshwater diatom Didymo is invasive in New Zealand and can't get from one freshwater lake to another without humans. A microbe adapted to briny seeps on Mars and to spreading in dust storms shielded from UV, may well not get to Earth in a meteorite, while a sealed sample tube including Martian atmosphere, at Mars atmospheric pressure, is like a mini spaceship.
12. Quarantine of humans can’t keep out a fungal disease of crops, mirror life etc.
13. So any unsterilized samples will need to be studied remotely via telerobotics which also greatly reduces forwards contamination (issues with filtering ultramicrobacteria will go both ways).
14. Astrobiologists now have tiny instruments that can go from sample preparation to life detection, even to a gene sequence[r], operated remotely on Mars. They could send hundreds of these in each 7 ton payload of the Ariane 5 to above GEO.

Let's make this an even better mission and SAFE for Earth.
Thanks!

(. Comment by Robert Walker posted December 20th)

 

DRAFT: Open letter to NASA | Response to final PEIS | Planetary protection issues abstract | main points in open letter in more depth | Finding an inspiring future | executive summary of preprint | Low risk like house fires and smoke detectors | About me | DRAFT: Endorsements by experts | Why this needs an open letter with endorsements | Call to NASA to defer or withdraw EIS | Letters | BOOK: Preprint to submit to academic publishers

Author: Robert Walker, contact email robert@robertinventor.com